 Not
Too Late for Afghanistan
by Nick Grono and Joanna Nathan
International intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 was not an
altruistic whim. After all, the Afghan people had long been
abandoned to years of fratricidal civil war, followed by Taliban
rule, at the end of the Cold War.
Rather this was -- and is -- about global security. The further
we get from 11 September, the more it needs to be repeated: if
we don’t confront extremism at its source, it comes to our
shores. Abandoning Afghanistan is not an option.
Today,
British troops are bearing the brunt of a belated move to
Afghanistan’s restive southern provinces. This is coming as
something of a shock to the British public and media, having
been sold the line that Afghanistan was a “success story” before
attention and resources moved to Iraq.
Afghanistan was “won” so
speedily back in 2001 by co-opting local warlords and
commanders. The failure to quickly expand international
peacekeepers beyond Kabul in the aftermath meant a terrible loss
of momentum. Indeed this year, there will be more than three
times as many foreign troops in Afghanistan as there were in
2002 or 2003.
These
numbers are the exact reverse of what should have happened. This
is not hindsight. The International Crisis Group was arguing for
more boots on the ground to help enforce the peace back in 2002,
when they would have been gratefully received by the local
population.
But it is
obviously more important now to look forward. Those nations
prepared to go to the dangerous south should be applauded, and
they should get every kind of backup they need in terms of troop
numbers, equipment and domestic support. And far more pointed
questions should be directed at those members of NATO not
prepared to put their fighters in the areas of greatest need in
Afghanistan. The importance of the move south cannot be
overstated: quite simply, without stabilising the south, you
will not stabilise Afghanistan.
So, what
can be done at this stage to help ensure success? Above all,
policies towards Pakistan, the West’s slippery “ally” in the war
on terror, need to come under closer scrutiny. It was the
sanctuary of this international border that allowed Taliban
leadership to survive the 2001 war and regroup in the
intervening years.
Today,
Taliban leadership and spokespeople operate brazenly in areas
bordering Afghanistan’s Pashtun belt in the south and east. Its
fundamentalist religious schools, never reformed despite
countless promises by President General Musharraf, offer almost
limitless recruits.
Such a
state of affairs is unlikely to change under Pakistan’s military
dictatorship, reliant as it is on support from the very Islamist
parties that built up -- and continue to back -- the Taliban.
Afghans simply cannot understand why more is not being done in
to pressure Pakistan, leading to the most bizarre rumours, even
amongst highly educated Afghans, that the foreigners are not
really interested in regional stability but are here for more
nefarious designs.
At the
same time the current insecurity is not solely a cross-border
phenomenon. Within Afghanistan a dangerous level of
disillusionment has set in amongst the population, largely due
to the notorious figures that were co-opted by the West and
Karzai government.
Many are
the very same warlords and commanders whose corruption and
brutality caused the population to welcome the Taliban in the
first place. Today, they reap the benefits of a culture of
impunity and a large number also have a hand in the flourishing
opium trade.
It is
truly horrifying that many of those currently in power have
absolutely no desire to see the spread of the rule of law
threaten their trade. This is what lies at the heart of much of
the current conflict in drug-ridden and lawless Helmand, often
simplistically and mistakenly blamed solely on the “Taliban”.
Ultimately, stability in Afghanistan will not be brought about
by the gun. But robust international military commitments can
offer the time and space for Kabul – and the international
community – to put in the good administrators and build up the
institutions that can offer sustainable security and services to
the population.
International commitment to building up the police and judicial
system has been dismally slow and under-resourced to date.
Building the rule of law must now become the priority.
The
Afghan government’s side of the deal must be a genuine war on
corruption and abusive officials, tackling the narcotics
industry from the very top and ending the climate of impunity.
Kabul must be firmly told that business as usual is
unacceptable.
Afghanistan, as the British public are only now discovering,
might not be on the inevitable road to success. But given
international security and economic support, failure and its
devastating consequences may yet be averted.
Nick Grono is Vice President of the International Crisis Group.
Joanna Nathan is Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst in Kabul.
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